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18 On Arithmetical Truth of the
Self-Referential Sentences
KAAVE LAJEVARDI & SAEED SALEHI
Abstract
We take an argument of Gödel’s from his ground-breaking 1931 paper, generalize it, and
examine its validity. The argument in question is this: the sentence G says about itself
that it is not provable, and G is indeed not provable; therefore, G is true.
1 Introduction
As is well known, Gödel begins his 1931 masterpiece [2] with an introductory section,
Section 1, wherein he explains the main ideas behind the (first) incompleteness theorem
in an informal and intuitive way, with an explicit caveat that those remarks are being
made “without any claim to complete precision”. What he does in that section is, among
other things, to introduce, in a very lucid way, the idea of encoding the syntax and that of
diagonalization.
But Gödel’s introduction is not confined to what can be found, more formally ex-
pressed, in the technical parts of the paper. Gödel’s official statement of the first incom-
pleteness theorem (his Theorem VI) asserts that for every theory satisfying certain condi-
tions, there is a sentence, now called the Gödel sentence of the theory, which is expressible
in the language of the theory but is neither provable nor refutable in the theory—the theo-
rem does not talk about the truth of that undecidable sentence. In his Section 1, however,
Gödel chooses to also talk about the truth of the Gödel sentence of the system of Prin-
cipia Mathematica, and observes that the proof of the first incompleteness theorem, as
presented in that section, is similar to Richard’s paradox. Whatever expository merits it
might have, this move is a problematic one, and Gödel shows awareness of this. He says
that his method of proof is applicable to any formal system that has two conditions, the
second of which being “every provable formula is true in the interpretation considered”
([2, page 151] emphasis added). He then writes, “The purpose of carrying out the above
proof with full precision in what follows is, among other things, to replace the second
of the assumptions just mentioned by a purely formal and much weaker one” (ibid, em-
phasis added). This “much weaker” condition, called ω-consistency by Gödel, is one of
the points of focus in our discussion (note that ω-consistency is stronger than [simple]
consistency, see e.g. [4, Theorems 14,15]).
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Our purpose in this note is not to philosophize about the notion of truth or doing
exegetical work on its rôle in Gödel’s classic paper. Rather, we wish to draw attentions
to an informal argument, to the effect that the Gödel sentence of the system Principia
Mathematica is true (that is, true in N), which is presented by Gödel in his introductory
section. The argument in question goes as follows [2, p. 151] (italics in the original):
From the remark that [R(q); q] says about itself that it
is not provable, it follows at once that [R(q); q] is true,
for [R(q); q] is indeed unprovable (being undecidable).
Here [R(q); q] is what is now called the Gödel sentence of a theory (or “system”) which
is subject to the first incompleteness theorem (that can be taken as Peano’s Arithmetic PA
or its recursively axiomatizable ω-consistent extensions). This is nowadays denoted by
G, which is by definition a sentence P that is equivalent to ¬Pr(#P ) (also provably so),
where Pr is the provability predicate of the theory and #P is the standard term for the
Gödel number of P .
As we understand the above passage, its logical form is the following, where A is an
arbitrary sentence expressible in the language of the theory:
(1) A says about itself that it has a property F .
(2) A indeed has the property F .
(3) Therefore: A is true.
That Gödel says that it follows at once (Gödel’s term “sofort” could also be trans-
lated to immediately) that G is true suggests that, in Gödel’s view, we are not dealing
with an enthymeme—it seems to us that, for Gödel, the argument scheme has no missing
premises. It is our task in the next section to argue that the (1)–(3) argument scheme is in-
valid, that is to say, there are situations wherein the premises are true while the conclusion
false. Naturally enough, the validity of the argument hinges on its terms, in particular on
what it is for a sentence to be “true”, and what is meant by a sentence “saying of itself” that
it has a certain property. As for the first term, it is almost obvious from Gödel’s introduc-
tory section that, like many modern writers in mathematical logic, when he writes “true”
simpliciter, he means true in the standard model, N (thus [2]’s footnote 4 on page 145:
“... no other notions occur but + (addition) and · (multiplication), both for natural num-
bers, and in which the quantifiers (x), too, apply to natural numbers only.”) Regarding the
notion of saying something of oneself, we shall consider two interpretations that might be
ascribed to Gödel.
2 The Invalidity of the Generalized Argument
How are we to understand the expression “A says that it has the property F ”? Modulo
an agreement over the meaning of “holding”, to which we shall return shortly, we find it
quite plausible to think that if the conditional A −→ F (#A) holds, then A says, inter
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alia, that A has property F . So, if we take “holding” as “being true in the standard model
of natural numbers N” and “saying” as “implying”, then the argument is not valid: if we
take γ to be the sentence G ∧ (0 = 1) then both of the sentences γ → ¬Pr(#γ) and
¬Pr(#γ) hold, but γ does not hold. Thus to say that A says, exactly, that A has property
F must be something stronger, to wit that the biconditional A ←→ F (#A) holds. And
this is, in fact, what is taken by some authors (including Gödel) to be the meaning of “A
says of A that it has property F ” (see e.g. [3, 6] and references therein).
As for the meaning of “holding”, we already presented evidence for the claim that
what Gödel meant by it is being true in the standard model, N. However, let us recognize
another reading of it—which is also suggested in the literature (see [3, 6] and references
therein)—namely being provable in a given theory. Having fixed a theory T (which we
suppose to be an ω-consistent, recursively axiomatizable extension of Peano’s Arithmetic
PA), we then have eight possible ways of interpreting the (1)–(3) argument scheme. Here
is the complete list, of which we find (VII), (V), and (III) the most interesting:
(I)
N  A↔ F (#A), N  F (#A)
N  A
(II)
N  A↔ F (#A), N  F (#A)
T ⊢ A
(III)
N  A↔ F (#A), T ⊢ F (#A)
N  A
(IV)
N  A↔ F (#A), T ⊢ F (#A)
T ⊢ A
(V)
T ⊢ A↔ F (#A), N  F (#A)
N  A
(VI)
T ⊢ A↔ F (#A), N  F (#A)
T ⊢ A
(VII)
T ⊢ A↔ F (#A), T ⊢ F (#A)
N  A
(VIII)
T ⊢ A↔ F (#A), T ⊢ F (#A)
T ⊢ A
Of these, (I) and (VIII) are of course valid because of the truth-condition of the ma-
terial conditional and Modus Ponens, respectively. For all other cases, we will present
triples (A,F, T ) which invalidate them.
Theorem 2.1 The argument (IV) is invalid for A = G, F (x) ≡ (x = #G), and T = PA.
Proof. Obviously, N  F (#G) and T ⊢ F (#G). By Gödel’s proof N  G holds and so
N  G ↔ F (#G). On the other hand, by Gödel’s theorem, T 0 G. ❑
Theorem 2.2 The arguments (II) and (VI) are invalid for A = G, F (x) ≡ ¬Pr(x), and
T = PA.
Proof.We already haveN  G ↔ ¬Pr(#G). Since by Gödel’s theoremwe havePA 0 G,
it follows that ¬Pr(#G) is true, i.e., N  ¬Pr(#G). ❑
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Of course the arguments (III), (V) and (VII) are all valid if T is a sound theory (i.e.,
when N  T ). As we mentioned in the Introduction, Gödel replaces the soundness con-
dition with the much weaker condition of ω-consistency. As Isaacson mentions in [4],
Gödel states in [2] that the notion of ω-consistency is “much weaker” than soundness but
gives no argument for this claim. It is shown in [4, Proposition 19] (with a proof attributed
to Kreisel in the 1950s) that there exists a false sentence K such that the theory PA + K
is ω-consistent. Also, the sentence K is a diagonal sentence of a formula H(x); i.e., the
equivalence K ↔ H(#K) holds (is PA-provable and true in N).
Theorem 2.3 The argument (V) does not hold for A = K, F (x) ≡ (x = #K), and
T = PA + K.
Proof. By PA ⊢ F (#K) we have PA + K ⊢ K ↔ F (#K). Now, N  F (#K) holds
trivially. By [4, Propositions 19], N 2 K. ❑
Theorem 2.4 Neither (III) nor (VII) hold for A = K, F (x) ≡ H(x), and T = PA + K.
Proof.We already have PA ⊢ K ↔ H(#K) and N  K ↔ H(#K) by definition, and so
PA+K ⊢ K ↔ H(#K) holds too. The latter also implies that PA+K ⊢ H(#K). Finally,
by [4, Propositions 19] we have N 2 K. ❑
Let us acknowledge the fact that perhaps it is only by overgeneralizing Gödel’s in-
formal argument that we are making it invalid. Had we not abstracted from the specific
properties of A, F , and T , Gödel’s informal argument would be valid, even in the inter-
esting cases of (III), (V), and (VII) (though it would lose much of its appeal). This is
substantiated in the following:
Proposition 2.5 If A,F are both Π1 and T is an ω-consistent extension of PA, then the
arguments (III), (V), and (VII) are valid.
Proof. IfA,F (x) ∈ Π1 then F (#A) andA↔ F (#A) are bothΣ2. By [4, Theorem 17],
all the T -provable Σ2-sentences are true. So, the provability of F (#A) or A ↔ F (#A)
in T implies their truth. Whence, (III), (V), and (VII) all reduce to (I). ❑
3 Back to the Truth of the Gödel Sentence
The sentence G is called the Gödel sentence of the theory in consideration (say, of PA).
One probable rationale for this is that if G′ is any other sentence that is equivalent to its
unprovability, that is G′ is equivalent to ¬Pr(#G′), then G and G′ are equivalent (see
e.g., [5]). But this is not a convincing reason when the theory is not sound:
Remark 3.1 Let S = PA + ¬Con(PA), where Con(PA) is the consistency statement of
PA, ¬Pr(#[0=1]). By Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem the theory S is consistent
(but not sound). We show that for any trueΣ1-sentence σ, the sentence σ′ which is defined
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to be Con(S)∧σ, is equivalent to its unprovability in S; later we also show that this holds
for any false Π1-sentence ̺ too.
To see this take σ to be any true Σ1-sentence. Then by Löb’s Theorem we have
S ⊢ Con(S)→ ¬PrS(#Con(S)) and by the Σ1-completeness, S ⊢ σ; so
S ⊢ Con(S) ∧ σ → ¬PrS(#[Con(S) ∧ σ]).
On the other hand S ⊢ ¬PrS(#ψ) → Con(S), for any ψ, which, together with S ⊢ σ,
implies the derivability of the converse implication
S ⊢ ¬PrS(#[Con(S) ∧ σ])→ Con(S) ∧ σ.
Thus, σ′ = Con(S) ∧ σ is equivalent to its unprovability in S: S ⊢ σ′ ↔ ¬PrS(#σ′).
Now, take ̺ to be a false Π1-sentence. Then N  ¬̺ and ¬̺ ∈ Σ1; so S ⊢ ¬̺. Also,
S ⊢ ¬Con(S) (because S ⊢ ¬Con(PA) and PA ⊂ S); whence S ⊢ PrS(#θ) for any θ
and in particular S ⊢ PrS(#̺). So, S ⊢ ̺↔ ¬PrS(#̺) which shows that ̺ is equivalent
to its unprovability in S.
It can be easily seen that none of the true sentences σ′ = Con(S)∧ σ (where we have
N  σ ∈ Σ1) is equivalent to any of the false Π1-sentences ̺ (where N 2 ̺), even though
they are all provably equivalent inside the theory S. ✧
Thus, a sentence which is equivalent to its unprovability inside a theory, does not
deserve to be called “the Gödel sentence” of that theory. A better definition could be:
Definition 3.2 The Gödel sentence of a theory T is a sentence P such that
(i) T ⊢ P ↔ ¬PrT (#P ) and also (ii) N  P ↔ ¬PrT (#P ).
All such sentences are equivalent (in N and provably in T if T ⊇ PA). ✧
Now, by this definition one can show that the Gödel sentence(s) of a theory is(are)
true if and only if the theory is consistent (cf. [4, Theorems 10,11]):
Theorem 3.3 Let P be the Gödel sentence of a theory T . Then P is true if and only if T
is consistent.
Proof. If P is true then, by Definition 3.2(ii), so is ¬PrT (#P ) thus T is consistent; and
if T is consistent then it cannot prove P (otherwise if T ⊢ P then on the one hand by
Definition 3.2(i) T ⊢ ¬PrT (#P ) and on the other hand PrT (#P ) is a true Σ1-sentence
and so is provable in T which contradicts the consistency of T ) and so ¬PrT (#P ) is true
whence, by Definition 3.2(ii), P is true. ❑
It has been argued in the literature (see e.g. [1] or [7] and references therein) that
since the consistency of the theory implies (and moreover is equivalent to) its Gödel’s
sentence(s), even provably so inside the theory, then for “seeing ” the truth of the Gödel
sentence(s) the consistency of the theory should be seen. Let us note, that a sentence
which is equivalent to its own provability inside the theory is not thereby (equivalent to)
the Gödel sentence(s) of the theory. In Remark 3.1 we had S ⊢ Con(S)↔ ̺ for any false
Π1-sentence ̺ (and also S ⊢ ̺ ↔ ¬PrS(#̺)) but Con(S) is a true Π1-sentence while ̺
is not. Our last result provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the truth of all the
Π1-sentences that are equivalent to their unprovability inside the theory.
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Theorem 3.4 For a recursively axiomatizable extension T of PA, all of the Π1-sentences
θ which satisfy T ⊢ θ ↔ ¬PrT (#θ) are true if and only if T + Con(T ) is consistent.
Proof. If T+Con(T ) is not consistent then T ⊢ ¬Con(T ) and so, T ⊢ Pr(#ψ) for any ψ.
Also, for any false Π1-sentence ̺ we have T ⊢ ¬̺. Whence, T ⊢ ̺↔ ¬PrT (#̺) holds
which shows that any false Π1-sentence is equivalent to its unprovability in T . Suppose
now that a false Π1-sentence θ satisfies T ⊢ θ ↔ ¬PrT (#θ). Then ¬θ is a true Σ1-
sentence, whence T ⊢ ¬θ. This, by T ⊢ θ ↔ Con(T ), implies that T ⊢ ¬Con(T ) and so
the theory T + Con(T ) is not consistent. ❑
The consistency of T + Con(T ) is a strictly stronger condition than the simple con-
sistency of T (see [4, Corollary 37]), while ω-consistent theories satisfy this condition
(see [4, Theorem 36]). Thus if a Π1-sentence says, inside a consistent theory, that it is not
provable in that theory, this, in itself, is no reason for believing that that sentence is true
(cf. Remark 3.1) unless that theory is also consistent with its own consistency statement.
Finally, let us note that the consistency of T +Con(T ) is a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for the independence (unprovability and unrefutability) of the Gödel sentences from
the theory (see [4, Theorem 35]).
4 Conclusion
Gödel’s original argumentwas this: the sentenceG says that it is not provable in T , andG
is indeed not provable in T ; thus G is true. A necessary condition for the validity of this
argument is the consistency of T , see Theorem 3.3; note that hereG does not need to be a
Π1-sentence. IfG says (only) inside the theory that it is not T -provable (and does not say
so in the real world, i.e., T ⊢ G↔ ¬PrT (#G) but N 2 G↔ ¬PrT (#G)), then G need
not be true, see Remark 3.1, as T might not be sound (and so T could be lying about G
or what it says!). So, Gödel’s argument is invalid in this case, even if G is a Π1-sentence.
But it is valid ifG is aΠ1-sentence and if T is ω-consistent (as Gödel wanted the theory to
be); see Theorem 3.4 and the explanations after its proof. Over-generalizing the argument
proved it to be invalid (in six out of the eight possible cases), whether we take “saying”
to be ‘inside the theory’ or ‘in the real world’ (N), and “holding” as ‘being true’ (in N)
or ‘being provable’ (in an ω-consistent, recursively axiomatizable extension of Peano’s
Arithmetic); see Theorems 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4. However, the argument remains valid
forΠ1-sentences andΠ1-properties, see Proposition 2.5, as they were in Gödel’s case [2].
Our (I)—(VIII) rules are overgeneralizing Gödel’s argument, since he would not mean
“the unprovability of G” to be provable in the theory, because by the second incomplete-
ness theorem (which was intended to be proved in the never-written second part of [2])
the consistency is not provable in the theory and so it cannot prove the unprovability of
anything; however, in the rules (III), (IV), (VII) and (VIII) we assumed the F (#A) to be
provable in the theory.
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